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PHENOMENOLOGY, COLONIALISM, AND THE 
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 
EDWARD L. RUBIN 
In A Realistic Theory of Law,1 Brian Tamanaha rejects the claim that 
universal legal principles exist, and its variant that essential features of law 
applicable to all societies can be identified. He argues that we should define 
law in accordance with our society’s ordinary usage of the term and analyze 
law in other societies on the basis of the practices they follow on subjects 
that fall within the boundaries of that usage. Tamanaha then observes that 
the effort to identify universal principles or essential features of law has 
interfered with our understanding of the way that law, as we define it, has 
evolved over the course of human history. Even more importantly, this 
effort has occluded our understanding of our own legal system, which is 
largely organization-based and managerial, and carries out a wide variety of 
functions beyond the traditional one of regulating relations between private 
persons.    
There are at least two major arguments against the positions that 
Tamanaha advances. The argument against rejecting any universal legal 
standards is that this rejection is a form of cultural relativism and thus 
precludes our ability to make moral judgments about other nations or other 
societies.2  Are we truly willing to say that slavery or human sacrifice is not 
wrong, but merely reflect a different cultural perspective; are we willing to 
say that there are no universal principles by which we can condemn 
someone like Hitler? The argument against allowing all the organizational 
and managerial practices of our society to count as law is that it validates 
governmental action that violates important legal or moral principles.3 Are 
we truly willing to say that discretionary, opaque, and result-oriented 
																																								 																				
1.  BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A REALISTIC THEORY OF LAW 9–11 (2017). 
2.  See generally MARC D. HAUSER, MORAL MINDS: HOW NATURE DESIGNED OUR UNIVERSAL 
SENSE OF RIGHT AND WRONG (2006); STEVEN LUKES, MORAL RELATIVISM (2008); MARTHA 
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behavior of modern administrative agencies does not raise concerns about 
their lawfulness? 
These may seem like separate objections, stated at different levels of 
generality, but I will maintain that they suffer from a common defect and 
thus are best answered with a single argument. That argument is that the 
principles by which we formulate our moral judgments are the product of 
our own society, the very same society that has generated our modern form 
of government. The idea that we can articulate and apply universal moral 
principles is simply a rhetorical device, characteristic of own society, and 
one that cannot withstand sustained examination. This does not preclude us 
from advancing moral arguments; rather, it means that the best moral 
arguments we can advance— the ones that will be most meaningful to us—
are derived from our own conceptual framework, that is, the framework 
generated by our own society. It also means that the concepts of law and 
government that will be most meaningful to us are our own concepts of 
those institutions. We can criticize those institutions, but global 
condemnations of them based on different concepts, concepts that are not 
our own, are also little more than rhetorical devices designed to grant an 
illusory validity to particular criticisms being voiced within the context of 
our own society’s debates.    
The underlying theory of this argument goes beyond the boundaries of 
the discussion in Tamanaha’s book. The book is designed to refute certain 
widespread positions in Anglo-American analytic jurisprudence4 and does 
so within the framework of that jurisprudence. The basic approach of 
analytic jurisprudence, like analytic philosophy in general, is to interrogate 
our own beliefs, to demand that we reflect on the values that we hold and 
the consequences they imply. Tamanaha’s reliance on this approach is not 
a defect, because the positions against which the book is directed are 
probably critiqued most effectively on their own terms.  
In my view, there is a more philosophically and psychologically 
convincing way to address general questions about law and legal systems. 
This is Husserl’s phenomenology, an approach less common in Anglo-
American jurisprudence but dominant on the European continent. I argue 
that phenomenology leads to a different and more effective answer to the 
two objections that might be raised against Tamanaha’s position, and 
thereby offers a different perspective on that position.  Thus, it is not a 
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GARDNER, LAW AS A LEAP OF FAITH (2012); H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961); JOSEPH RAZ, 
BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND INTERPRETATION (2009); JOSEPH RAZ, THE AUTHORITY OF LAW (1979); 













critique of Tamanaha’s argument, but rather an alternative route to the same 
conclusions that he reaches. 
This article applies a phenomenological approach to the subject matter 
of Tamanaha’s book, and the potential criticisms against it, in four sections. 
Section A shows why there are no universal principles of law and why any 
claim to such principles is incoherent. Section B then argues that the effort 
to find universal principles that apply to all legal systems is an inadequate 
and indeed defective way to understand legal systems other than our own. 
Section C argues that this effort is also an inadequate and defective way to 
understand our own legal system. The final section then applies these 
arguments to the modern administrative state and shows that global critiques 
of it, even at the most sophisticated level, tend to be based upon such 
asserted universal principles. The administrative state is our society’s mode 
of governance; its specific features can of course be criticized, but its basic 
existence is the product of the same conceptual processes that generate the 
basis for any criticisms that we might advance.  
I. WHY THERE ARE NO UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES OF LAW 
Phenomenology’s basic insight leads to the recognition that the search 
for universal principles of law is based on unsupportable assumptions. This 
reinforces Tamanaha’s argument against such principles, but does so on 
somewhat different grounds. Tamanaha states that his approach is grounded 
on pragmatism, an epistemological approach asserting that theoretical 
statements are to be judged on the basis of their usefulness.5 Pragmatism is 
not a demand that theory should have practical value—that it should be 
rejected unless it allows us to solve the mystery of gravitation or design a 
better government. The point, rather, is that a theory that fails to advance 
any sort of inquiry, including a theoretical one such as the basis of 
knowledge or the meaning of ethics, is an empty use of language, perhaps 
enjoyable as imaginative writing but of no philosophic value. Pragmatism 
is the only starting point that Tamanaha needs because analytic 
jurisprudence does not go beyond it. A theoretical argument that has no use, 
in pragmatism’s sense of that term, will not be relevant to such an inquiry; 
it cannot be deployed within analytic philosophy’s process of interrogation 
and argument. 
																																								 																				
5.  TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 2–3. He cites the work of William James, John Dewey, Charles 
Sanders Pierce and George Herbert Mead as the basis of this approach. On pragmatism generally, see 
Morris Dickstein, Introduction to THE REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, 
LAW, AND CULTURE 1 (Morris Dickstein ed., 1998); SUSAN HAACK, THE BLACKWELL COMPANION TO 
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Pragmatism becomes problematic, however, if we are not satisfied to 
base philosophic inquiry on arguments that appeal to us, as members of our 
own society, as reasonable or coherent, but rather seek to ground it on more 
basic considerations, namely, those that place the source and nature of our 
beliefs in question. This is the point at which Continental and Anglo-
American philosophy diverge. An analytic philosopher can assert: “I think, 
therefore I am.”6 When we reflect on this statement, we recognize that it 
effectively establishes the limits of doubt for an individual, since existence 
cannot be doubted by a process that implies existence. Continental 
philosophy, however asks: “Who are you?” What assumptions are built into 
the concept of a rational, conscious entity that can pursue the Cartesian 
analysis? What is the philosophic grounding of selfhood and thought, and 
what does it imply for the way that the self is constructed and thought 
pursued?7 
Husserl’s phenomenology offers an answer that has proved decisive in 
the development of Continental philosophy. All thought, he argues, is based 
upon experience.8 Our starting point is the world that surrounds us, the 
“lifeworld” in his terminology, and we are immersed—Heidegger says 
“thrown”9—into that world before we have any notion of ourselves as 
selves.10  We cannot stand apart from the lifeworld and speculate about its 
reality or its significance, because we are inevitably part of it, and all our 
thoughts and ideas derive from it. Because our lifeworld consists of our own 
experience, Husserl’s position is one of radical subjectivity; all the 
individual can know is what he or she has actually been in contact with and 
perceived or undergone. Part of that experience, however—an important 
and essential part—is contact with other human beings. Knowledge, culture, 
and the very ability to speak and think results from such contact. To describe 
this, Husserl uses the term “intersubjective,” indicating that each individual 
is formed and shaped by his or her own experience, but much of that 
																																								 																				
6.  That is the central question in RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD (1637), reprinted 
in RENE DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 1 (Donald A. 
Cress trans., 1988), and is often regarded as the beginning of modern philosophy.  
7.  EDMUND HUSSERL, CARTESIAN MEDITATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGY 
1–26 (Dorion Cairns trans., 1993). 
8.  EDMUND HUSSERL, IDEAS: GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE PHENOMENOLOGY 45–47 
(W.R. Boyce Gibson trans., 1962). 
9.  MARTIN HEIDEGGER, BEING AND TIME 174 (John Macquarrie & Edward Robinson trans., 
1962). 
10.  EDMUND HUSSERL, THE CRISIS OF THE EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL 
PHENOMENOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION TO PHENOMENOLOGICAL PHILOSOPHY 103–89 (David Carr 
trans., 1970); HUSSERL, supra note 8, at 91–96 (using the term world-about-me). For the development 
of Husserl’s thought on this subject, see RUDOLF BERNET, ISO KERN & EDUARD MARBACH, AN 
INTRODUCTION TO HUSSERLIAN PHENOMENOLOGY 217–28 (1993); DERMOT MORAN, INTRODUCTION 













experience consists of contact with other individuals who are similarly 
formed and shaped. This is, in effect, the answer to the “who are you” 
question that Husserl poses to Descartes in response to his claim that he will 
doubt everything and reach the conceptual starting point for all speculative 
thought.11  An enormously complex process of individual and 
intersubjective experience precedes the ability to ask that question, Husserl 
argues, and the reality of that process cannot be challenged or put into doubt 
because it is anterior to the ability to doubt and creates the entity that asks 
the question. 
The dominant approach to the human sciences and social theory, in 
Europe and increasingly in the Anglo-American world as well, can be 
attributed to the insights of Husserl and his followers. This approach is 
familiarly described as the “social construction of reality.”12 In essence, it 
means that the way people think, in any given society, will be determined 
intersubjectively, that is, by the lifeworld formed by their intersubjective 
experiences.13 Of course, individuals will also be shaped by their personal 
experiences, but the meaning of those experiences—the way that the 
individual perceives and processes them—will be the result of 
intersubjective understandings that prevail in the individual’s society. Those 
understandings can be described as interpretive, in the sense that the 
intersubjective process determines the way individuals process their 
experience and the significance that they attach to various aspects of it.14 
For example, George Lakoff points out in Women, Fire and Dangerous 
Things that much of the meaning we attach to objects we perceive depends 
on how we categorize them.15 We see lions and tigers as belonging within 
the narrow category of big cats, then within the only slightly larger category 
																																								 																				
11.  See HUSSERL, supra note 8. 
12.  PETER BERGER & THOMAS LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A 
TREATISE IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE (1966); ALFRED SCHUTZ, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE 
SOCIAL WORLD (George Walsh & Frederick Lehnert trans., 1967). See NELSON GOODMAN, WAYS OF 
WORLDMAKING (1978); WILLARD V.O. QUINE, WORD AND OBJECT (1960).  
13.  HUSSERL, supra note 8, at 94–95; HUSSERL, supra note 10, at 161–86. Because this concept 
involves the relation of consciousness to society, it is explored at length in Schutz’s application of 
phenomenology to social science. SCHUTZ, supra note 12, at 113–16, 139–214. The book holds a special 
status among the many works inspired by Husserl because Husserl read it and declared it to be fully 
consistent with his own ideas. 
14.  See HUSSERL, supra note 8, at 235–67. Husserl used the term “intentionality,” rather than 
interpretation. In a posthumously published work, he used “predicative judgment.” EDMUND HUSSERL, 
EXPERIENCE AND JUDGMENT (James S. Churchill & Karl Ameriks trans., 1973). Husserl’s followers, 
however, have used the term interpretation extensively and focused great attention on the concept. See 
HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD (Garrett Barden & John Cumming trans. 1988); 
HEIDEGGER, supra note 9, at 188–210; MARTIN HEIDEGGER, THE BASIC PROBLEMS OF 
PHENOMENOLOGY (Albert Hofstadter trans., 1988); SCHUTZ, supra note 12, at 71–96, 126–36. 
15.  See generally GEORGE LAKOFF, WOMEN, FIRE AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT 
CATEGORIES REVEAL ABOUT THE MIND (1987). 












of felines that includes ocelots and house cats, then within the relatively 
large category of mammals that includes rats and cattle, and then within the 
broad category of animals. Other societies create radically different 
categories, particularly those with totemic systems that distribute animals 
(that is, what we call animals) among different groupings that also include 
geographic features, astronomical features, and social clans.16 The idea that 
the individual’s perception of reality is essentially interpretive brought 
epistemology into contact with literary theory, and particularly the 
hermeneutic theory that had developed on the European Continent during 
the century that preceded Husserl.17 Joined to the insight that the 
intersubjective process is based heavily on language, and that language is 
obviously specific to a given society and varies substantially from one 
society to another, it produced the well-known “linguistic turn” in modern 
philosophy.18 
It follows from the phenomenological approach that individuals have no 
unmediated access to reality. What they think of as reality is the product of 
their own experience and the intersubjective understandings that enable 
them to interpret that experience. These experiences and understandings are 
anterior to any conclusions about reality that they might draw, and in fact 
anterior to any questions that they might choose to ask. Because the sense 
of reality is socially constructed, it will vary from one society to another; in 
other words, it will be culturally dependent. This does not deny that people 
have sensory experiences—on the contrary, Husserl insists that those 
experiences are the basis of thought, and anterior to any questions that might 
be raised about them—but rather that anything that we might say, or think, 
about sensory experiences will depend on the intersubjective 
understandings that prevail in our own society. No amount of introspection 
or speculation can enable one to escape from this socially constructed 
process and perceive some transcendental or trans-cultural essence of 
																																								 																				
16.  See, e.g., MARY DOUGLAS, PURITY AND DANGER: AN ANALYSIS OF THE CONCEPTS OF 
POLLUTION AND TABOO (1966); EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 
121–271 (Joseph Ward Swain trans., 1915). 
17.  WILHELM DILTHEY, PLAN FOR THE CONTINUATION OF THE FORMATION OF THE HISTORICAL 
WORLD IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES, reprinted in 3 WILHELM DILTHEY, SELECTED WORKS: THE 
FORMATION OF THE HISTORICAL WORLD IN THE HUMAN SCIENCES 213 (Rudolph A. Makkreel & 
William H. Oman trans., 2002); FRIEDRICH SCHLEIERMACHER, HERMENEUTICS AND CRITICISM AND 
OTHER WRITINGS (Andrew Bowie ed., 1998). See HANS W. FREI: THE ECLIPSE OF BIBLICAL 
NARRATIVE: A STUDY IN EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURY HERMENEUTICS (1974). 
18.  See generally ELIZABETH A. CLARK, HISTORY, THEORY, TEXT: HISTORIANS AND THE 
LINGUISTIC TURN (2004); CRISTINA LAFONT, THE LINGUISTIC TURN IN HERMENEUTIC PHILOSOPHY 
(Jose Medina trans., 1999); THE LINGUISTIC TURN: RECENT ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD 
(Richard Rorty ed., 1967); LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS (G.E.M. 













things, because the thought processes being deployed in this effort are 
produced by a particular society, and will be determined by that society’s 
intersubjective process. The more assiduously we search the thoughts and 
practices of other societies to discern transcendental truths, the more we 
demonstrate the force of cultural dependence because the search for 
transcendental truths can be easily shown to be a distinctive feature of 
Western thought. There is a well-known joke among anthropologists about 
the researcher who spends an entire day asking an informant from a small, 
remote society about the customs of the society, its matrilineal or patrilineal 
relations, its rituals, its means of distributing goods, and so forth until finally 
the weary informant exclaims, “Enough about you – I want to talk about 
me.” 
Husserlian epistemology provides full support for Tamanaha’s position 
about law and legal rules, while freeing it from any dependence on 
pragmatism and thus extending it beyond the bounds of Anglo-American 
analytic jurisprudence. While it does not deny that human beings, as a result 
of biological conditions they all experience, must all breathe, eat, sleep, and 
die, it strongly suggests that any feature of human society, such as law, will 
vary substantially from one place to another. More importantly, it indicates 
that this variation is not merely an empirical observation but a theoretical 
necessity. Different societies will necessarily produce different systems of 
law and different legal principles, just as surely as different individuals, 
asked to draw a picture of “a rural scene” will necessarily produce different 
drawings. Furthermore, and this is the greatest point of divergence between 
Continental and Anglo-American theory, even if one wants to maintain, as 
a matter of faith or as a working hypothesis, that there are universal 
principles of law, no individual could possibly have access to such 
principles. Individuals necessarily begin with the conceptual framework of 
their own society and can only approach other societies through that 
conceptual framework. This is, in fact, quite similar to William James’ 
version of pragmatism, although not to Charles Sanders Peirce’s version. 
James refused to acknowledge any difference between ideas and facts; like 
Husserl, he argued that all thought is derived from experience.19  
 
 
II. WHY THE SEARCH FOR UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES IS A BAD WAY TO 
																																								 																				
19.  WILLIAM JAMES, PRAGMATISM: A NEW NAME FOR SOME OLD WAYS OF THINKING (1907); 
WILLIAM JAMES, THE MEANING OF TRUTH: A SEQUEL TO “PRAGMATISM” (1909). For Peirce’s view, 
see CHARLES SANDERS PEIRCE, PHILOSOPHICAL WRITINGS OF PEIRCE (1955). 












UNDERSTAND THE LEGAL SYSTEMS OF OTHER SOCIETIES 
Phenomenology provides the tools by which we can achieve at least a 
partial understanding of a different society’s legal system at the same time 
that it demonstrates that we will never achieve complete understanding due 
to the socially constructed character of human thought. This may seem 
unsatisfactory; in fact, it supports Tamanaha’s argument that any valid 
understanding of a different society must begin by recognizing its difference 
from our own.  Two particular requirements suggested by Husserl’s 
epistemology for such understanding are erudition and introspection. One 
cannot approach a different society directly, assuming that its members 
think essentially the same way we do because they are instantiating 
universal principles of law. Rather, it is necessary to learn as much as we 
can about their own mode of thought, their own lifeworld. It is also 
necessary to engage in introspection—not introspection about the real 
nature of morality, or religion, and law, or about the universal principles 
that underlie those social systems—but rather introspection about the one 
thing we can reliably introspect about, which is our own conceptions and 
preconceptions. The further away the society is from our own, the more 
introspection will be needed. Husserl introduces the concept of bracketing 
for this technique; we cannot escape from our lifeworld, but we can make 
the effort to become aware of and then set aside or bracket its concepts as 
an aid to understanding different societies.20  
Gadamer offers the useful metaphor of a horizon to explicate the way 
society constructs our understanding through our lifeworld.21 The horizon 
determines the limits of our vision, and what we can see depends on what 
lies within our horizon. We can move (more on that later) but we will still 
be bound by a horizon, one of roughly the same size. It is also possible to 
see beyond the horizon by building a tower, but that requires a good deal of 
material and effort. Erudition and introspection can be analogized to those 
requirements, and the level of erudition and amount of effort that one must 
expend, in our current society, to be truly recognized as an expert about a 
																																								 																				
20.  Husserl proposed bracketing, or phenomenological reduction, as a way to free ourselves 
from the lifeworld generally and achieve a sort of mystical transcendence. HUSSERL, supra note 8 at 
139–67; HUSSERL supra note 10, at 135–54. Few of his many followers are persuaded by this aspect of 
his thought, and it is of course unnecessary to pursue in the context of this essay. Usage of the term here 
can be regarded as derived from Merleau-Ponty, who saw bracketing as a more limited device that 
reduced the effect on one’s culturally-determined preconceptions while simultaneously revealing that 
those preconceptions could never be fully escaped. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, THE PHENOMENOLOGY OF 
PERCEPTION (Colin Smith trans., 1972). 













different society is a measure of the task’s complexity, just as the difficulty 
of building the tower indicates how hard it is to see past the horizon. 
Tamanaha’s proposal that we use our own society’s definition of law to 
understand the legal system of other societies is presented, in his book, 
primarily as a means of avoiding the tendency to exclude fields of inquiry 
by fiat because other societies use a different definition. But he carefully 
refuses to attach any significance to this technique beyond its usefulness in 
defining the topic of our inquiry. In particular, he challenges the claim, 
advanced by Joseph Raz and others, that if other societies “lack institutions 
with the essential features of law, they do not have law according to our 
current concept of law.”22 This is unobjectionable, Tamanaha argues, “so 
long as Raz restricts his assertion to the claim that our parochial concept of 
law can be applied to examine and evaluate other contexts,” and that Raz 
does not claim that “his account of the nature of law is not just universally 
applicable but also universally true for all times and places.23   
Phenomenology adds a further level of significance to Tamanaha’s 
argument. The claim that societies that lack certain essential institutions do 
not have law may sound theoretical, but it is in fact naïve because it fails to 
analyze the basis on which the claim of essentiality is being advanced. No 
argument about the legal norms of our society can articulate an adequate 
analysis because such an argument can only be framed by juxtaposing our 
conceptions of law to different ones, from different societies. Tamanaha’s 
formulation is purposively naïve—he bases his definition on ordinary 
language—but it is in fact epistemologically sophisticated because it invites 
the process of introspection that phenomenology recommends. It requires 
us to identify our conception of law, to acknowledge it as merely our 
conception, and then contrast that conception with a different society’s view 
of the same subject that embodies a different conception of law, or perhaps 
is not identified as law at all. This contrast tends to trigger the centerpiece 
of modern interpretive theory, namely the hermeneutic circle. The differing 
approach of the other society not only illuminates the way this society 
conceives of law, but then challenges us to reconsider our own conception 
because no claim has been made for that conception’s validity. In doing so, 
we not only rethink our conception but also come to a better understanding 
of the other society because we have achieved a better grasp of its distinctive 
features. 
A familiar criticism of the effort to identify universal principles of law, 
forcefully and extensively presented by Tamanaha, is that it does nothing 
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more than seek to dress up a contested assertion about law within our own 
society in the raiment of universality.24 From the pragmatic perspective, this 
criticism can be phrased in terms of insincerity. With the exception of 
Ancient Greece and Rome, and possibly ancient Israel, why would we, in 
this society, care about the legal views of a society that is different and 
remote from our own?25 Suppose there are principles that are so universal 
that they can be found among the Aztecs, the Mongol nomads, and the 
Zulus. What difference could that possibly make to us? It is arguable that 
slavery, social hierarchy, and the subordination of women are among the 
most widespread features of legal systems other than our own that can be 
found, certainly more common than non-contradictory laws or an 
independent judiciary. Does that have any truly persuasive force for us? 
Claims that certain features of our legal system are universal, or necessary 
for the concept of law, seem designed to provide a rhetorical advantage to 
proponents of those features, an advantage derived from our distinctive, 
socially-constructed desire for universal principles. 
A further argument against this tendency, more closely related to 
phenomenology, is that the effort to identify universal principles of law is a 
simply dreadful way to understand the legal system of different societies, 
and thus denies us the opportunity to understand our distinctive, socially 
constructed views by contrasting them with these different systems. 
Arguments that another legal system provides evidence of universal 
principles are often notable for their cavalier, tone-deaf treatment of that 
legal system. Consider F.A. Hayek’s argument, described by Tamanaha in 
an earlier book,26 that the rule of law means “rules fixed and announced 
beforehand—rules which make it possible to foresee with fair certainty how 
the authority will use its coercive power.”27 Hayek’s motivation for this 
assertion is quite evidently his desire to demonstrate that societies engaged 
in economic planning violate the rule of law, while those that abjure this 
approach and rely on a market regulated only by the common law, follow 
the rule of law and are thus more just or free. At some subsequent time, it 
occurred to Hayek, or was pointed out to him, that prior notice of the rules 
																																								 																				
24.  Id. at 57–81. 
25.  We care about these two remote societies because we regard them as our forebears, and thus 
an important source of our own views. In the case of ancient Greece and Rome, this attitude arises from 
physical, linguistic and ethnic continuity, from our view of classical philosophy and literature as 
authoritative sources, and from our ability to contextualize those sources through historical knowledge. 
The case of ancient Israel is not as clear, because we recognize only one authoritative text, but lack the 
other continuities or the contextualizing historical knowledge. Consequently, it seems likely that we do 
not know, or truly care, what the ancient Hebrews really thought, but simply take the text that they 
produced and interpret it in accordance with the norms and concepts of our own society. 
26.  BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, ON THE RULE OF LAW: HISTORY, POLITICS, THEORY 65–72 (2004). 













is in fact a standard feature of social planning, and it is the common law 
system that fails to provide people with notice because it evolves by 
incremental revision of prior doctrine in litigated cases, and thus has an 
intrinsically retroactive character.28 Justice Cardozo’s famous decision in 
MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,29 rejected the rule of privity in mass 
marketing contexts and held a car manufacturer liable to a remote purchaser. 
The decision is considered a landmark of common law, and an indication of 
its flexibility,30 but it changed the law without notice; Buick had every 
reason to assume, based on the prevailing common law doctrine, that it 
would only be liable to direct purchasers of its product, such as automobile 
dealers.  
Once Hayek became aware of this first-year law school observation 
about common law, he attempted to shore up his position with a historical 
argument about the development of common law in the society that 
preceded our own. Common law, he said, was customary law, emerging 
from the dispersed, spontaneous actions of private individuals engaged in 
self-motivated interactions, and then transcribed and organized, or 
legalized, by judges in the process of deciding individual cases.31 Echoing 
St. Thomas Aquinas,32 he argued that this law achieved a kind of rationality, 
that is, an effective means of ordering a market economy, by a process that 
resembled Adam Smith’s invisible hand and that aligned with what we now 
identify as “the wisdom of crowds.”33 But as Tamanaha explains in his 
present book,34 the association of common law with customary law was an 
argument advanced by English judges, most notably Sir Edward Coke, as a 
mode of opposition to the Stuart monarchy. The idea was that the common 
law dated back before the Norman Conquest, to England’s Anglo-Saxon 
past, and thus, by the prevailing principle that age conferred authority, was 
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superior to, and thus independent of the king.35 This contention served as a 
conceptual basis for American legal education, but by the time Hayek wrote, 
it had been disproved by Pollock and Maitland.36    
In fact, the association of common law with customary law is erroneous 
in ways that relate directly to other arguments in Tamanaha’s current book, 
and to the discussion of the modern administrative state in the following 
section. To begin with, common law cannot be contrasted with statutory law 
because it was the product of statute. Although based on preceding legal 
thought and practices, the decisive step in its establishment was legislation 
enacted by Henry II in the latter part of the twelfth century, primarily for 
the purpose of creating royal judges (that is, judges appointed by and loyal 
to Henry) who could resolve the land disputes that resulting from the civil 
war that preceded Henry’s accession to the throne.37 It is true that Henry’s 
statutes did not prescribe the content of the law to be applied, but rather left 
that to his appointed judges. However, the idea that these royal officials, all 
members of the social elite, would somehow transcribe the customary law 
of ordinary people in reaching their decisions seems implausible, however. 
In fact, the very name of the body of law that they created, namely 
“common” law, suggests that this law was intended to displace rather than 
reflect the customary law. At the time of Henry’s enactments, each English 
country, and often each baronial estate, had its own set of legal rules, and 
these at least arguably embodied customary law.38 The common law 
imposed by royal judges established a regime-wide set of legal rules, and 
was thus a precocious tool of nation-state formation that Continental 
regimes would subsequently adopt through more systematically established 
legal codes. Predictably, the barons resisted it and a few decades after its 
establishment, they sought to protect their individual, and presumably 
customary systems of law from the common law’s control in one chapter of 
the Magna Carta.39 
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The subsequent development of common law continued to be carried out 
by royal officials, all of whom were members of England’s social elite, 
members who as time went on, received increasingly formalized and 
elaborate training.40 They had only limited contact with the common people, 
and thus with the customary law that must be ascribed to these people in 
order to have any meaning at all. Over time, in fact, English common law 
became notorious for its complex doctrines and elaborate procedures, not 
for its reflection of ordinary people’s practices. A clear indication of this 
separation is Lord Mansfield’s effort to incorporate the customary law of 
London merchants into common law by creating a merchant jury of “City 
men” that he could consult in commercial cases.41 These men were hardly 
ordinary English people, but rather a different subset of the English elite. 
Even this modest effort to reach out beyond the self-contained limits of 
judicial doctrine was abandoned and its apparent oddity attests to the 
separation between common and customary law. To be sure, ordinary 
people appear in the common law judicial process as jurors, but they are 
carefully instructed about the legal rules that they are obligated to apply; a 
judge who told the jurors to use their own intuitive sense of law would be 
reversed as having committed legal error. 
Another example of the way in which the search for universal principles 
occludes our understanding of different legal systems can be found in 
Richard Epstein’s work. Like Hayek, Epstein is intent on demonstrating that 
modern economic regulation is not simply bad policy, but violates enduring 
legal principles. In Supreme Neglect, Epstein argues that a universal 
principle of property rights is that they permit the property owner to exclude 
“all the world” from intruding on her property, a principle that would place 
significant constraints on economic regulation. In our own legal tradition, 
he traces this principle back to Magna Carta.42 But the principal signatories 
of that document, and the leaders of the rebellion that the document was 
intended to resolve, were the great barons of the realm, who were tenants-
in-chief of King John.43 Their concern in Magna Carta, the principle source 
of both their income and their status, was the land that they controlled. Far 
from being able to exclude “all the world” from this land, they held their 
property subject to an extensive range of feudal privileges that King John 
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could assert.44 They sought, as an innovative legal reform, the right to 
bequeath their land to their heirs, or allow their widows in possession of the 
land to marry anyone of their choice, without the king’s permission.45 This 
hardly seems consistent with a right to exclude the world. In fact, it was 
standard practice in Angevin England for the king to travel through the 
realm, staying at the most convenient baronial manor and being lavishly 
entertained while doing so.46 Was this obvious and massive intrusion, 
something we would regard as an offensive interference with our property, 
a matter of law or custom? Could the baron refuse and what would be the 
consequences if he did? These are interesting questions for anyone who 
wants to understand medieval England, but they are hardly advanced by 
declaring that exclusion of “all the world” is a universal feature of property 
rights. In fact, it is not clear that the idea of exclusion has any real meaning 
in the Medieval context. Typically, a baron’s landed holdings did not consist 
of a house on 2.7 acres surrounded by a picket fence, as it does for us, but 
rather a series of villages and their surrounding fields, often widely 
separated from each other. They were insistent on their ability to derive 
income from this property, and knight’s service from their vassals (or by 
this late date, monetary payments in place of service), but it seems unlikely 
that the right to exclude would even be comprehensible to them.  
In his book Design for Liberty, Epstein notes a “sharp contrast” between 
classical liberal attitudes (which he endorses) and “progressive attitudes 
toward economic liberties” (which he condemns). 47 Not content with 
offering policy-based arguments for his preferences, he writes: “The older 
model of labor contracts allowed parties to construct their own deals, so that 
the public force was concentrated on the interpretation and enforcement of 
their agreements, not on imposing new terms and conditions on all private 
deals within a given class.”48 The theme that modern economic regulation 
represents a departure from established principles of law appears throughout 
the book, and in Epstein’s other works as well. It is true provided that one 
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identifies older or established principles of law as those that prevailed 
during the seven or eight decades between the onset of industrialization and 
the rise of social welfare legislation. Prior to the industrialization of Europe, 
and the concomitant enclosure movement in England, the model of 
contracts that prevailed was one of intensive regulation. Quality of artisanal 
products and quantity of output was set by craft guilds,49 sale of land was 
constrained by restrictions remaining from the feudal system,50 interest on 
loans was either forbidden or strictly limited by usury laws, and price was 
controlled, at least in theory, by the just price doctrine which prescribed, 
and sometimes actually imposed, prison sentences on those who violated its 
strictures.51 Many magnificent works of European art were commissioned 
by bankers and merchants who were expiating for the sin of contracting 
“their own deals” on the terms of their choice.52   
These examples, which could be compounded ad infinitum, indicate that 
the search for universal principles, and even the more modest efforts to 
identify enduring themes over extended periods of history, leads to 
distortion and misunderstanding of societies that are different from our own, 
that is, beyond our lifeworld. This is hardly surprising because these 
searches and efforts are transparently designed to recruit those different 
societies as allies for contemporary arguments. Phenomenology explains 
this; because we are immersed in our lifeworld, the arguments in which we 
are engaged within that lifeworld will be of primary importance to us, and 
present themselves to us with an intensity that makes other enterprises seem 
lackluster by comparison. If we nonetheless want to pursue this academic 
																																								 																				
49.  See STEVEN A. EPSTEIN, WAGE LABOR AND GUILDS IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE (1991); FRANCIS 
GIES & JOSEPH GIES, LIFE IN A MEDIEVAL CITY 78–93 (1969); RUTH MAZZO KARRAS, BOYS TO MEN: 
FORMATIONS OF MASCULINITY IN LATE MEDIEVAL EUROPE 109–150 (2003); GEORGE UNWIN, THE 
GUILDS AND COMPANIES OF LONDON (4th ed. 1963). 
50.  See BLOCH, supra note 44, at 163–75; F.L. GANSHOF, FEUDALISM 106–49 (Philip Grierson 
trans., 1964). In some places, although not in post-Conquest England, lords had full (allodial) rights over 
their land, but most actual landholders were vassals. Prohibitions on bequeathing the land they controlled 
to their heirs were abandoned early in the Medieval era, but prohibitions on alienation lasted longer, and 
required payments for permission to sell lasted longer still. Village land was often held in common, with 
severe restrictions on its alienation or division, see FRANCES GIES & JOSEPH GIES, supra note 49, at 6–
18, and its transformation into private property in England by the enclosure movement aroused great 
opposition. See DOROTHY GEORGE, ENGLAND IN TRANSITION 77–99 (1951); R.H. TAWNEY, RELIGION 
AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 118–28 (1926). 
51.  See WILLIAM ASHLEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO ENGLISH ECONOMIC HISTORY AND THEORY 
126–62 (4th ed. 1920); JOHN M. CLARK, SOCIAL CONTROL OF BUSINESS 23–24 (2d ed. 1939); DAVID 
HAWKES, THE CULTURE OF USURY IN RENAISSANCE ENGLAND (2010); ERIC KERRIDGE, USURY, 
INTEREST AND THE REFORMATION (2002); TAWNEY, supra note 50, at 11–60. The prohibition on usury 
as violating principles of Christianity led, of course, to the emergence of the Jews as moneylenders.  
52.  This includes Giotto’s frescoes in the Arena or Scrovegni Chapel, certainly one of the 
greatest works of art ever produced. See Benjamin G. Kohl, GIOTTO AND HIS LAY PATRONS, in THE 
CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO GIOTTO 176 (Anne Derbes & Mark Sandona eds., 2004). 












effort to understand a different society, we must make a conscientious effort 
to bracket our own views, rather than wallowing in those views as we seek 
to advance them. In particular, we must employ erudition and introspection, 
learning as much as we can about the other society and conscientiously 
attempting to bracket the views that the lifeworld of our society imposes. 
This does not require us to abandon the desirable effort to learn useful 
lessons from other societies; what it does mean is that those lessons are not 
to be obtained by searching through those societies for validation of our 
present views. It is the differentness of those societies, their ability to help 
us problematize or bracket our own views that provide the lessons.53 Instead 
of seeing common law as customary, and thus as a sort of free market legal 
alternative to legislation, we might try to understand the actual purposes that 
it served in pre-modern England. That could aid us in determining where 
we want common law to be continued, and how we might obtain the 
advantages it possessed in different settings, such as commercial arbitration 
or administrative regulation. Instead of touting the right to exclude as a 
universal principle of property, and our present system of regulation as legal 
apostasy, we might use its absence from prior law as a way to question our 
current legal rules. At present, for example, many people’s property consists 
largely of stocks, bonds, retirement benefits or government entitlements. 
Are these usefully conceived as a pot of money from which others can be 
excluded, or rather as an ongoing allocation that is secured in some ways 
and contingent in others? Different societies, whether past or present, can 
help us problematize and bracket the lifeworld concepts that are otherwise 
so totally engulfing for us, but only if we make a conscientious effort to 
understand the very different lifeworlds that these other societies possessed. 
III. WHY THE SEARCH FOR UNIVERSAL PRINCIPLES WITHIN OUR OWN 
SOCIETY IS A BAD WAY TO UNDERSTAND OURSELVES 
Phenomenology further demonstrates that the search for universal 
principles of law is not only a defective way to understand the legal system 
of another society but also a defective way of understanding our own 
society. The point can be explicated by generalizing from one of 
Tamanaha’s principal arguments against the claim that universal principles 
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of law exist, namely the nature of law in colonial regimes. This is an 
argument that he has advanced in prior works as well.54 It is often asserted 
that law is a necessary means by which a society maintains social order, but 
in a colonial regime the prevailing law has often been imposed by the 
colonizing power as a means of exploitation.  
Another conclusion from phenomenology is that the experience of 
people in a given society can readily diverge from the legal system to which 
they are subject.  It is often asserted that law always provides the framework 
for social relations, but in a colonial regime the imposed law tends to 
disrupts those relations. This objection can be answered by claiming that the 
legal regime imposed by a colonial power is not really law, but the costs of 
such exclusion are immense. To begin with, a great many nations—almost 
the entire Global South—was subject to colonization, and much of it 
continues to rely on laws that colonizing powers imposed on them. A 
universal theory that excludes nearly half the world is not particularly 
universal.  
The argument that colonialism was an exploitive process is certainly not 
difficult to make, but it is in fact not necessary to the claim that the 
imposition of law by colonial powers disproves the existence of universal 
principles. Perhaps some aspects of colonialism were beneficial, or perhaps 
the process was too widespread and complex to be judged in its entirety. 
The criminal code that was drafted by Thomas Macaulay and imposed on 
British India reflected British, and to some extent European, thinking about 
the optimal form of law and can thus be seen as a conscientious effort to 
improve the lives of people in the colony.55 Those people are themselves 
divided about whether this is true; while praise for colonialism in not 
fashionable at present,56 the fact remains that most of the independent 
nations that were formed out of British India, including the Republic of 
India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka, continue to use variations of the 
Macaulay code.57 What is unarguable is that they perceive this code as 
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different from their indigenous law, so much so that Indians who are seen 
as overly devoted to Western European values are sometimes called 
“Macaulay’s children.”58  
The process of borrowing another nation’s law, moreover, is much more 
widespread than colonialism. Many nations have voluntarily adopted large 
portions of the Napoleonic Code.59  Japan, in its process of modernization, 
adopted British law, then German law, precisely because it differed from 
the law of the traditional culture that they wanted to displace.60 In China, 
Western law and concepts were extensively introduced over the course of 
the nineteenth century, and at the beginning of the twentieth century, the 
Qing government’s Commission of Legal Reform revised many existing 
laws on Anglo-American and other models.61 Mao Zedong can be viewed 
as rejecting Western law, but the ideology on which he based this rejection 
was Marxism, itself an import from the West. Since 1980 or so, the People’s 
Republic of China has been assiduously drafting laws based on European 
and American models, which they see as an antidote to the discretionary, 
hortatory, and disruptive system that prevailed under Mao.62 Thus, for the 
vast majority of people in the world, large portions of the legal regime under 
which they live have been borrowed from the West and are perceived as 
containing provisions, and based on principles, that are distinctly different 
from their indigenous law. It would be difficult to argue that they are wrong 
in his perception, and that the law they have borrowed and their indigenous 
law embody the same basic principles.  To do so, one would need to adopt 
a strongly dismissive attitude to the people who live with, and are thus 
familiar, with both legal systems. The claim, in fact, could be described as 
a form of intellectual colonialism. 
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This consideration leads to a still more general one about the nature of 
legal systems. Most nations, even those that have never been colonized, 
have legal systems composed of different elements, derived from different 
sources. The usual account of Western history, for example, is that its legal 
system represents an uneven and only partially homogenized blend of three 
different traditions, namely Greco-Roman, Germanic, and Jewish.63 Each of 
these, particularly the Greco-Roman one that represented a blend of at least 
two different cultures that evolved over the course of a millennium, is itself 
complex. But even if one simplifies them into a few basic principles, it 
appears that those principles were different ones, reflecting different 
conceptions of law, at the time of the Early Middle Ages (fifth to seventh 
centuries) when Western society can be said to begin. Greco-Roman law 
was seen as originating in the state, established by command of the 
Emperor, and legitimated on that basis. As received by Early Medieval 
society, it consisted of a systematic code that contained elaborate rules 
regarding interpersonal behavior and property ownership.64 Legal sanctions 
were imposed for violation of those rules, generally by means of jury trials 
that were supposed to weigh the evidence and reach conclusions on its basis. 
German law was regarded as emerging from the customs of the people, and 
promulgated by a king who was required to respect those customs. Legal 
penalties were prescribed for causing harm, not for violating rules, and the 
legal sanction was compensation for the harm by means of wergild. Factual 
disputes about whether a particular person was responsible for the harm 
were determined by ordeal or combat.65 Jewish law, as received in the West 
through Christianity, was seen as the command of God, who not only 
prescribed basic principles such as those found in the Decalogue but also 
the detailed matters of ritual and social behavior that appear in Leviticus 
and Deuteronomy.66 It allowed for direct appeals to God, and contained the 
principle that a holy man could condemn the ruler for violating divinely 
ordained law, as Nathan does when he charges King David with murder for 
sending Uriah the Hittite to the front.67 
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These are, of course, gross generalizations, but they are sufficient to 
indicate that Western law originated from a mélange of different legal 
principles that seem clearly inconsistent with each other. Over time, of 
course, these principles were blended, and since Western Europe was free 
from foreign invasion by the year 1000, it had the opportunity to develop a 
coherent legal system without further disruption. But the blending process 
did not proceed smoothly; conflicts between the different legal principles 
pervade Western history. One of the most notable is between the Catholic 
Church, with its scripture-based insistence on divine law as interpreted by 
holy men, and the Roman principle that law is a promulgation of civil 
authorities, who exercise supreme command.68 A millennium after the 
beginning of Western society, this remained a source of legal conflict; one 
of the central motivations for the Reformation in Northern Europe was to 
establish the Roman principle, and subordinate religious authority to 
national rulers.69   Several centuries later, Marbury v. Madison modified this 
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Samuel 12:5 (King James). Nathan memorably responds: “Thou are the man.” II Samuel 12:7 (King 
James). David, also a prophet of course, recognizes the justice of this accusation and repents. 
68.  This conflict is one of the dominant themes in Western history, a continuing struggle 
between secular and religious rulers punctuated by spectacular confrontations. Charlemagne’s son 
divided the great Carolingian Empire among his three sons, giving one the west (now France), one the 
east (now Germany) and the third the center, whose remnant is the Low Countries, Alsace-Lorraine, 
Switzerland, Piedmont and North Italy. Its king, Lothar II, wanted to divorce his wife, who had given 
him no children, and marry his concubine, who had given him several, thereby securing the succession 
to his crown. Pope Nicholas I refused, and after a titanic, decade-long struggle, Lothar died in 869 
without heirs, and his kingdom broke apart, decisively shaping the map of Europe to this day. See 
FRANCES GIES & JOSEPH GIES, MARRIAGE AND FAMILY IN THE MIDDLE AGES 88–94 (1987); CHRIS 
WICKHAM, THE INHERITANCE OF ROME: ILLUMINATING THE DARK AGES 420–22 (2009). In 1077, the 
Holy Roman Emperor, Henry IV, came into conflict with Pope Gregory VII, over the right to name 
bishops in the Empire, long the prerogative of the Emperor but now claimed by the Pope as part of a 
comprehensive Church reform program. Henry found it necessary to beg the Pope’s forgiveness, 
kneeling in the snow for three days as a penitent at the gates of Canossa Castle until Gregory felt 
compelled to absolve him. Within a few years, Henry returned to Italy with an army and besieged 
Gregory in Rome. Gregory responded by allying himself with the ferocious Norman ruler of Naples, 
Robert Guiscard, who raised the siege, sacked the city, and made a prisoner of Gregory, who promptly 
died. See GEOFFREY BARRACLOUGH, THE ORIGINS OF MODERN GERMANY 120–25 (1984); TOM 
HOLLAND, THE FORGE OF CHRISTENDOM: THE END OF DAYS AND THE EPIC OF THE WEST xiii–xx, 359–
90 (2008). These were struggles for power between rival institutions, but they were actuated by distinctly 
different conceptions of law, in particular, who exercised ultimate authority and from what source that 
authority derived. 
69.  Protestantism enabled the German princes to assert their control over the religious practices 
and institutions within their realms, freeing themselves from the joint control of the Catholic Church and 
the Catholic Holy Roman Emperor (Charles V). See BARRACLOUGH, supra note 68, at 355–73; 
DIARMAID MACCULLOCH, THE REFORMATION: A HISTORY 158–205 (2003). Henry VIII’s demand to 
annul a marriage that produced no heir led to conflict with the Pope (Clement VII), much as Lothar’s 













principle,70 in effect reviving the Jewish principle that the ruler must 
conform to higher law, as interpreted by those with special understanding 
of this higher doctrine, or perhaps the Germanic principle that the ruler must 
conform to custom. Lord Coke, often regarded as the progenitor of judicial 
review on the basis of his decisions and proclamations,71 knew well that it 
could not be reconciled with either Roman law; denied the authority of the 
Church by the Reformation, he attributed the power of courts to resist or 
countermand royal authority to the Celts.72 
The jagged combination of different legal principles in our own society 
is also reflected in our means of resolving factual disputes. Jury trials, where 
the decision is controlled by law and determined by evidence, might appear 
to be a classic embodiment of Western legal principles, and like Epstein’s 
property rules, are often traced back to Magna Carta’s command that no one 
should be held legally guilty or liable “except by lawful judgment of his 
peers.”73 In fact, the idea that jury trials should be used as a means of 
determining legal liability can be dated to 1215, the year Magna Carta was 
promulgated; unfortunately, it was initiated, at the earliest, about six months 
later in that year. At the time of Magna Carta, factual disputes were still 
being determined by ordeal or combat.74 This practice was evidently based 
on Germanic customary law, but it had been overlaid by the Judeo-Christian 
doctrine that God would determine the result of these seemingly arbitrary 
																																								 																				
English church. See WINSTON S, CHURCHILL, THE NEW WORLD 53–85 (1956); DIARMAID 
MACCULLOCH, THE REFORMATION: A HISTORY 198–204 (2003). 
70.  5 U.S. 137 (1803). In requiring the ruler to submit to legal rules as interpreted by an 
institution that is independent of the ruler. Marbury domesticates the right of revolution.  Medieval 
thinkers, aware that a ruler might violate God’s law, argued that people had a right to rebel against a 
ruler of that sort. They were equally aware, however, that this remedy is highly disruptive, and so risky 
for those asserting it that it is unlikely to be used. Marbury is based on the same idea that the ruler should 
be subject to the law, but provides a means by which individual actions by the ruler that violate the law 
can be reversed without overthrowing the ruler itself. For further explication of this interpretation of 
Marbury, see Edward Rubin, Judicial Review and the Right to Resist, 97 GEO. L.J. 61 (2008). 
71.  E.g., Jentleman’s Case, (1583) 6 Reports 11a (K.B.), reprinted in 1 THE SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE 157–60 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) (stating that the king appoints 
judges but cannot determine their decisions after appointment); Prohibitions del Roy, 12 Reports 63, 
reprinted in 1 THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE 478–81 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003) 
(arguing that the king may not decide a case at law). 
72.  EDWARD COKE, PREFACE TO PART II OF THE REPORTS (1602), reprinted in THE SELECTED 
WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE, supra note 71, at 39, 40 (“If the ancient Lawes of this noble Island 
had not excelled all others, it would not be but some of the severall Conquerors, and Governors thereof; 
That is to say, the Romanes, Saxons, Danes or Normans, and specially the Romanes, who (as they justly 
may) doe boast of their Civill Lawes, would (as every of them might) have altered or changed the 
same.”). 
73.  MAGNA CARTA, cl. 39, reprinted in HOLT supra note 39, at 452. 
74.  See ROBERT BARTLETT, TRIAL BY FIRE AND WATER: THE MEDIEVAL JUDICIAL ORDEAL 13–
33 (1986); DAN JONES, MAGNA CARTA: THE BIRTH OF LIBERTY 164–65 (2015); MORTIMER, supra note 
38, at 55–56; GEORGE NEILSON, TRIAL BY COMBAT 31–74 (1890).  












events; reflecting this reinterpretation, the person who officiated at the event 
was a priest, not a government appointee. The reference in Magna Carta to 
the judgment of one’s peers probably refers to the special council of twenty-
five barons established in Chapter 61 of the document and applicable only 
to its signatories, a further warning against imposing our own legal concepts 
on a different society.75 The practice of using jury trials to determine factual 
disputes began to develop after 1215 because Lateran IV prohibited priests 
from officiating in the ordeal.76 The Lateran IV decrees applied to all of 
Western Europe, of course, but England complied much more quickly than 
other realms because King John, for political reasons, had declared himself 
a vassal of the Pope.77 This relatively rapid shift in legal practice probably 
caused the newly-instituted jury trials to reflect some of the adversarial 
features that characterized trial by combat, still the prevailing means of 
resolving land disputes between members of the nobility in 1215.78 
Continental regimes were able to shift to civil trials more gradually, and 
combat had become outmoded by that time, with the result that their trial 
procedures are less adversarial and more investigative or inquisitorial.    
The somewhat awkward pastiche of practices resulting from England’s 
rapidly-initiated jury trials is reflected to this day in our legal system. On 
the one hand, trials are regarded as a means of weighing evidence to 
determine actual facts about the external world, and many of their specific 
procedures are based on the accuracy or reliability of the evidence 
																																								 																				
75.  HOLT, supra note 39, at 10, 56, 78–80. This was the Court of Twenty-Five. According to 
Holt, and again indicative of the gap between the medieval society that generated Magna Carta and our 
own, the precedent for this arrangement may have been “the London council of twenty-five mentioned 
by the city chronicler, fitz Thedmar, under 1200-1.” Id. at 56 (footnote omitted). Holt also notes that the 
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Jerusalem allowing vassals to renounce their fealty if the king imprisoned a vassal without judgment, 
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violated their privileges. Id. at 78–79. In other words, the “judgment of their peers” clause in Chapter 39 
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76.  “No subdeacon, deacon, or priest shall practice that part of surgery involving burning and 
cutting. Neither shall anyone in judicial tests or ordeals by hot or cold water or hot iron bestow any 
blessing; the earlier prohibitions in regard to dueling remain in force.” TWELFTH ECUMENICAL COUNCIL: 
LATERAN IV, CANON 18, https://perma.cc/T6FU-CUV5. See BAKER, supra note 37, at 63–66; 
BARTLETT, supra note 74, at 34–102; JONES, supra note 74, at 164; PLUCKNETT, supra note 40, at 114–
25; WARREN, supra note 37, at 321–22. There were, of course, broader social changes that supported 
implementation of the Lateran decree, just as there were social changes that had generated the decree. 
See John W. Baldwin, The Intellectual Preparation for the Canon of 1215 Against Ordeals, 36 
SPECULUM 613 (1961). The crucial point is that Magna Carta cannot be read as establishing a right to 
jury trials. 
77.  MORTIMER, supra note 46, at 121–22; HOLT, supra note 39, at 216–18; JONES, supra note 
74, at 80–164. 













presented. On the other hand, trials are regarded as a procedure that 
establishes facts through an adversary process, which means that untrue 
statements about the world will be accepted if the parties agree to them, and 
that judges cannot carry out their own investigation of the facts, no matter 
how reliable that effort may be. In other words, bundled together in this 
familiar mode of legal decision making, often regarded as embodying 
universal principles of law, are two different concepts of legality and legal 
dispute resolution. If the idea of legal principles has any content, rather than 
being an empty and formulaic recitation, it must be acknowledged that these 
principles are inconsistent with each other. Thus, we need not venture as far 
afield as the Ancient Maya or the Golden Horde to find evidence that legal 
systems can embody conflicting concepts; such conflicts exist in our own 
backyard. 
The same point can be made about many other societies as well. 
Macaulay’s code was clearly a disruption and displacement of prevailing 
Indian law, but that law was itself a complex mixture of Hindu law and 
Islamic law of the previous Moghul conquerors of India.79 Japan, perhaps 
the most homogenous and culturally unified nation in the modern world, 
derives its legal concepts from its native Shinto culture, overlaid by 
massive, albeit voluntary borrowing of Chinese law, influenced by the 
subsequent adoption of Buddhism, transformed by another voluntary 
borrowing of British and German law, and then modified by the law 
imposed during the American occupation, much of which has been kept in 
place.80 In other words, it is not only difficult to find evidence of legal 
principles that are universal among the legal systems of different societies, 
but it is also difficult to find such principles that are universal within a single 
society. Conquest, trade, immigration, voluntary borrowing, and 
innumerable other contacts tend to render any society’s legal system a 
complex mixture of different and often inconsistent principles. The idea of 
law as springing from the essence of a society’s primordial and continuous 
experience is a romantic fantasy of nineteenth century historical 
jurisprudence, and one reason for the decline of this approach that 
Tamanaha documents as the beginning of his book.81 
																																								 																				
79.  On the interaction between Hindu and Islamic culture after the Moghul conquest, see JOHN 
KEAY, INDIA: A HISTORY 289–382 (2000); THOMAS R. TRAUTMANN, INDIA: BRIEF HISTORY OF A 
CIVILIZATION 148–68 (2010). In fact, the interaction began several centuries earlier, with the incursion 
of earlier Islamic groups from Central Asia into the Delhi area. JOHN KEAY, INDIA: A HISTORY 231–61 
(2000). 
80.  See R. H.P. MASON & J.G. CAIGER, A HISTORY OF JAPAN (rev. ed. 1997); W. SCOTT 
MORTON & J. KENNETH OLENIK, JAPAN: ITS HISTORY AND CULTURE (4th ed. 2005); REISCHAUER, 
supra note 60.  
81.  TAMANAHA, supra note 1, at 16–24. 












But we are not yet done. Quite apart from the differences and 
inconsistencies that result from divergent cultural influences, other 
differences and inconsistencies are likely to arise due to wealth and 
educational divisions within the society. What we define as the legal system 
of a given society generally reflects the concepts and beliefs of its literate 
elite. The common law of England, highly touted as an embodiment of 
autochthonous and enduring legal principles, was created by royal judges 
who were universally drawn from the tiny upper stratum of English 
society.82 The attorneys representing litigants in those courts came from the 
same stratum, or perhaps a marginally broader one as time went on.83 The 
litigants themselves represented a larger portion of society, being 
merchants, artisans, and small landowners, but even so they probably 
represented only a minority of the populace.84 There remained a large 
number of farmhands, tenant farmers, cottagers, manual laborers, peddlers, 
ordinary servants, impoverished widows, and vagrants who rarely appeared 
in common law courts as plaintiffs because they could not understand the 
proceedings or afford a lawyer.85 They did appear as defendants in criminal 
cases, generally dazed, bewildered and inarticulate, and often on their way 
to the gallows.86 We know that they were not even subject to the common 
law for the first several centuries after its establishment because of the 
continued existence of manorial courts, as described above. What we do not 
know, because written records are lacking, is the nature of the law that they 
themselves used, understood, and were governed by in their ordinary 
relations. The question here does not involve specialized bodies of law for 
different purposes. The church’s canon law was a specialized body of law 
in this sense, but a well-educated cleric fully understood the common law, 
its boundaries, and the differences between that law and the law governing 
the Church, and would have been a fully competent participant in any 
common law case in which he might be involved. In contrast, it seems 
possible that the large number of uneducated, low-status, and impoverished 
people in English society found the prevailing legal system 
																																								 																				
82.  BAKER, supra note 37, at 143–47; POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 36, at 160–61.  
83.  BAKER, supra note 37, at 147–49; see generally MICHAEL BIRKS, GENTLEMEN OF THE LAW 
(1960). 
84.  See BERMAN, supra note 65, at 390–403. 
85.  See POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 36, at 160 (“Walter Map has told us how in the 
exchequer a poor man obtained an expeditious judgment against a rich antagonist. Of this as of a 
marvelous thing he spoke to Ranulf Glanvill.”).  
86.  See PETER LINEBAUGH, THE LONDON HANGED: CRIME AND CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE 
EIGHTEENTH CENTURY (2d ed. 2003); DOUGLAS HAY ET AL., ALBION’S FATAL TREE: CRIME AND 













incomprehensible and substituted their own rather different concepts in its 
place. 
Proponents of universal law, or even of prevailing legal principles within 
a given society, tend to assert the contrary, but these assertions are typically 
mere declarations of faith. Often, they result from simply ignoring the issue. 
In Design for Liberty, Epstein treats John Locke’s Second Treatise as a 
statement of the universal principles of the English law of property and 
perhaps of law in general.87 This does not require much research, since the 
Second Treatise is readily available, but it is not clear that Locke, who was 
a genius, even reflects the typical views of the elite class to which he 
belonged. Assuming he does, a question arises whether the views about 
property that he advances can be taken as embodying or articulating some 
general, universal rules of property. Locke describes these views, after all, 
as being directly and self-evidently derived from God.88 No problem, 
according to Epstein: Locke’s “insistent and fervid repetition of the ‘natural 
and divine law’ theme surely did no harm, and in some close cases an appeal 
to the rule of law may have tipped the scales against abuses of state 
power.”89Perhaps that is true if one is only concerned about the propertied 
classes who may have shared Locke’s ideas, and who certainly would have 
benefitted from their application. But what about the great mass of people 
who were consigned to subordinate status by that natural and divine law, 
who were defined as inferior because of prevailing beliefs that social 
hierarchy and vast inequalities of wealth, privilege, and opportunity were 
required by God’s Great Chain of Being?90 Did they share Locke’s view 
about the sacrosanct nature of property, and can it fairly be said that his view 
did them no harm? 
The few accounts we have of actual lower-class life in pre-modern 
Europe suggest that these people inhabited a different world from that of the 
middle classes and the elite.91 They spoke a different dialect, followed 
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TOLERATION 100 (Ian Shapiro ed., 2003). 
88.  LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT AND A LETTER CONCERNING TOLERATION, 
supra note 87, at 111–21. 
89.  EPSTEIN, supra note 48, at 14. 
90.  See ARTHUR O. LOVEJOY, THE GREAT CHAIN OF BEING: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY OF AN 
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91.  For a remarkable study, although relatively recent, see HENRY MAYHEW, ET AL., LONDON 
LABOR AND LONDON POOR (1861), republished as HENRY MAYHEW, ET AL., THE LONDON 
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different customs, ate different food, wore different clothes,92 and faced 
different concerns. They had a different type of education (generally none 
at all), a different experience of the Christian religion, and a different 
relationship to government. It seems implausible that they shared the same 
legal concepts as the elite; in any case, such a counterintuitive claim would 
need to be demonstrated with evidence before it could be accepted.  Many 
of these differences have been effaced in modern society, not only by our 
democratic system of governance and theory of rights but also by the mass 
media and public education.  Nonetheless, studies of people in impoverished 
communities, concededly a smaller proportion of our population than the 
Medieval or Early Modern lower classes, but still a significant number, 
suggest that they have distinctly different ideas about the law and the legal 
order of society. Henry Peder Lundsgaarde reports that they regard lethal 
violence as a legitimate response to verbal insults,93 Sudhir Venkatesh that 
they treat group loyalty and mutual protection as their primary norms,94 and 
Matthew Desmond that they have virtually no sense that landlord-tenant 
relations are governed by contract law.95 Their attitudes more closely 
resemble the legal systems of the Early Middle Ages, where central 
government authority was weak and people needed to protect themselves 
through mutual support groups.96 Janet Landa reports a similar phenomenon 
among overseas Chinese communities in Southeast Asia, who avoid the 
official courts as prejudiced and corrupt, and maintain their own (often more 
demanding) rules regarding contractual performance.97 
 These further variations and discontinuities in legal systems go beyond 
Tamanaha’s example of colonial exploitation, but his theory of law readily 
accommodates them. As he says in defense of his “conventionalist” 
approach to the subject: “There are multiple manifestations of law, each 
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94.  SUDHIR VENKATESH, GANG LEADER FOR A DAY: A ROGUE SOCIOLOGIST TAKES TO THE 
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with a collection of characteristics, none essential or necessary, and much 
variation amongst them.”98 The multiple layers of law in Western society, 
in India, or in Japan might pose a challenge to theories claiming that law is 
necessarily an integrated system or a reflection of universal principles, but 
it is simply a matter for discussion with Tamanaha’s “realistic” approach to 
the subject. Because he limits law to systems established by the government, 
he might want to exclude the alternatives to the dominant legal system that 
sometimes flourish in impoverished or oppressed communities.99 That only 
means, however, that he might want to assign their exploration to someone 
with different training (the authors of the studies cited above,100 
significantly, are all sociologists and anthropologists, not lawyers), not that 
they pose a conceptual challenge to his approach. The reason is that they 
take the place of law; that is, they serve the same function as government-
established rules for communities where the government rules are not 
applied, accessible, or comprehended. They are thus distinguishable from 
the systems that Tamanaha wants to exclude, such as the rules that govern 
a sports association or a university. Members of those organizations, like 
the educated members of the Medieval Church, understand the prevailing 
government-established law, and also understand that their own rules apply 
in a distinct arena separate from public jurisdiction. To include them within 
a theory of law robs that theory of its necessary contours, as Tamanaha 
argues. But the rules by which people in impoverished or oppressed 
communities live occupy the same role as governmental rules, and thus can 
be treated as relevant to his consideration of our legal system in a way that 
would not be true for the rules of the United States Golf Association.  
Phenomenology provides further insight on the issue of inconsistent or 
conflicting laws within a given society. Husserl’s approach is radically 
subjective; the experience from which consciousness arises, and the 
consciousness that results, are separate for each individual according to this 
theory. That is why he uses the term “intersubjective” for interactions 
between individuals, rather than social or cultural. But he recognizes this 
intersubjectivity as essential for thought because it provides the individual 
with the terms and structures that allow for the interpretation of sense 
experience, and the extension of understanding beyond that immediate 
experience. Because this intersubjectivity remains an individual experience, 
however, rather than being generalized as society or culture, there is no 
necessity that it be uniform within a given society, or indeed have any other 
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99.  Id. at 51–54. 
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necessary features that relate to the society in general. Thus, to begin where 
the preceding succession of considerations ended, the intersubjective 
experience of poor or oppressed people in a given society might be quite 
different from the experience of the elite. Perhaps all members of the society 
share a common worldview, unified by collective rituals or continuously 
maintained channels of communication; perhaps different groups within a 
society have radically different experiences and concepts. Both possibilities, 
and all their intermediate variations, can be accommodated by Husserl’s 
approach because it is based on the individual’s experience, not any claims 
about the society at large. 
Going further, phenomenology also provides an account of the way that 
disparate concepts of law can coexist within a given society. The 
universalists whom Tamanaha criticizes often assume that a legal order 
must possess certain unifying features in order to function, or to count as 
law. But Gadamer’s analysis of textual interpretation suggests a conceptual 
mechanism that can overcome this assumption. As previously mentioned, 
his metaphor for the lifeworld is a space that is centered on the individual 
and bound by a horizon. Reading a text, however, involves a fusion of 
horizons, an interaction between the lifeworld of the reader and the text’s 
originator that is mediated by the hermeneutic circle.101 An individual in a 
society that has borrowed law from a different society, or had that different 
law imposed on it by colonization, can mediate between the two systems of 
law by a similar process. The foreign legal system, through its acquisition 
or imposition, has become an element in the person’s lifeworld, and is thus 
available for interpretation and adaptation. Because the process is ultimately 
grounded in each individual’s consciousness, it will vary from one person 
to another. In India, there were many uneducated peasants who undoubtedly 
viewed the British as we would view aliens from outer space, while others 
became Macaulay’s children. The result is a complex intermixture, varying 
from person to person or group to group, with many different modes of 
mediating between the two conflicting legal systems. To trace these 
variations requires empirically-based microanalysis, not generalizations 
about the universality of legal concepts. 
 
IV. WHY THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE DOES NOT VIOLATE OUR LEGAL 
PRINCIPLES 
																																								 																				













As stated at the outset, a second objection to Tamanaha’s book is that his 
approach precludes global criticism of the modern administrative state. A 
phenomenological approach to our society’s legal system explains why this 
objection is invalid; specifically, why global criticisms are generally based 
on the assertion that there are universal principles of law. Here again, 
phenomenology provides support for Tamanaha’s realistic theory of law, in 
this case as applied to the administrative state. As Tamanaha points out, 
proponents of the position that there are universal features of law, including 
both H.L.A. Hart and Lon Fuller, often ignore many standard features of 
modern administrative governance because these features fail to conform to 
their supposedly universal principles. Hart, for example, defines law as an 
effort to instruct citizens how to behave. This leaves him unable to explain 
something as common as disability benefits, whose purpose is not to induce 
people to become disabled.102 Fuller insists that law must be stated in 
generally applicable terms, which places a statute creating a national park 
outside the boundaries of law.103 Tamanaha deploys his conventionalist 
definition of law in opposition to these jurisprudential exclusions. People in 
modern society describe the government’s grant of disability benefits or its 
creation of a national park as enactment of a law.  The failure to 
accommodate these provisions within the category of law invalidates the 
category, not the provisions.104 
Beginning with modern society’s understanding of law thus precludes 
global condemnations of the governmental system that prevails in the 
society. This is often regarded as a defect in that it precludes the claim that 
this state has ventured outside the proper boundaries of law. The claim is 
not, of course, that a realistic definition such as Tamanaha’s forestalls 
criticisms of particular administrative actions. Disability benefits can be 
included in the category of law, but if coverage is denied to some people on 
the basis of their religion or sexual orientation, these benefits can be readily 
condemned as illegal.  Creating a national park may be regarded as an act 
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apply to private citizens. In an administrative state, many laws are directed to administrative agencies, 
not directly to citizens, and his supposed principles are simply not relevant. See Rubin, supra note 53, 
at 217–18; Rubin, supra note 102, at 397–408. 
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of law, but it is illegal if the legislators were bribed by businesses located 
on the road leading to the park. Rather, the criticism of a realistic or 
inclusive definition of law is that it precludes the claim that the 
administrative state is illegal in its entirety, that it violates the rule of law or 
represents the abandonment of valid legal principles. 
The immediately apparent problem with an argument of this sort is its 
implausibility. How could a mode of governance that has been adopted by 
a democratic nation, over the course of a century or more, and repeatedly 
reconfirmed and expanded, violate that nation’s concept of law? 
Administrative governance was not imposed on the U.S., or on the other 
Western nations that have adopted it, by a colonizing power. Perhaps it 
could be claimed that the British violated India’s conception of law, but how 
could they have been violating their own conception? This question reveals 
that the answer offered by critics of the administrative state is simply 
another version of the idea that there are necessary and universal principles 
of law. Just as these asserted principles can be a means of projecting our 
own value onto different societies, they can be a means of restating policy-
based objections to administrative government in jurisprudential terms. For 
those who dislike the administrative state, the general principles of law that 
they discern are typically formulations designed to exclude administrative 
government from the charmed circle of legality. 
Stated more generally, the phenomenological argument is that the only 
legal concepts that we have available to us are those generated by our own 
society. To formulate a global condemnation of the government created by 
one’s own society, it would be necessary to show that the government has 
diverged, in its entirety, from the society’s prevailing legal norms. That is 
possible, but it must be demonstrated—not by invoking different legal 
norms that are asserted as universal but by showing how a government that 
embodies norms that diverge from those of its citizens can come into power. 
In the U.S., opposition to the administrative state is often grounded on 
interpretation of the Constitution.105 It is certainly conceivable that a 
government existing at some later time could violate the legal norms 
embodied in a founding document. But demonstrating that such a violation 
has occurred must again be based on some discontinuity, some explanation 
how a government that rejected the document’s norms could develop. The 
claim that a gradual process of change, generated and accepted at every 
stage through democratic processes, violates the founding principles can 
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only be based on the idea that those principles exist outside the social 
process – in other words, that they are universal principles to which the 
claimant has some sort of special access. As the preceding sections have 
shown, such claims are incoherent.  
A much more formidable objection to administrative government, 
although not stated in the categorical terms of critics such as Hayek, is 
advanced by Jurgen Habermas, writing in the phenomenological tradition. 
This is his idea that modern government represents the colonization of the 
lifeworld, in effect that we have colonized ourselves in the process of 
developing our present, technological society.106 Habermas’s position is 
based on the identification of four distinct modes of action, which he defines 
as “those symbolic expressions with which the actor takes up a relation to 
at least one world.”107 These “worlds,” which can be thought of as 
conceptual orientations, are teleological (instrumental action to produce 
pragmatic results), constative (theoretical), normative (moral) and 
dramaturgical (aesthetic).108 Collectively, they constitute the essence of the 
individual’s lifeworld. Following Max Weber, Habermas argues that, in pre-
modern society, these modes of action were integrated with each other by 
an overarching system of meaning.109 Modernity, however, has disrupted 
this unity through the increasing dominance of purposive rational action, 
that is, instrumental behavior that does not function as part of an overall 
action orientation, but rather as an independent principle detached from any 
identified purpose. Its institutional manifestation is bureaucracy, a 
hierarchical structure of full-time employees chosen on the basis of merit or 
credentials and devoted to achieving a specified purpose.110 Weber does not 
limit bureaucratic structure to government, but rather sees it as a modern 
form of organization that dominates private business firms as well, and 
Habermas agrees with and follows this interpretation. 
Bureaucratic organization enables both political and economic 
institutions to develop highly effective and increasingly complex modes of 
operation. It is these institutions that colonize the lifeworld of the individual. 
That is, they create structures that exceed the individual’s ability to 
understand them, thereby denying people conceptual access to the forces 
that control their lives. This is Habermas’s image of colonization. In 
government, it occurs through the instrumentality of “juridification,” which 
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Habermas defines as “the tendency toward an increase in formal (or 
positive, written) law that can be observed in modern society.”111 In other 
words, we have imposed on ourselves a system of law that is as 
incomprehensible to us as the law of a colonial power is to the native people 
it has colonized.  
This is a powerful critique of the administrative state. It does not depend 
on invoking any fanciful set of universal principles that have been 
concocted to reinforce the critic’s a priori distaste for modern government. 
Instead, it charges modern government, and modern society in general, with 
having generated forces that contradict its own most crucial values, namely 
democratic rule and human rights. In colonizing ourselves, Habermas 
suggests, we have betrayed ourselves, created internal contradictions that 
we ourselves condemn and from which we need to find a pathway for 
emancipation. 
The short answer to this critique, in terms of Tamanaha’s book, is that 
his realistic approach to administrative government is doing the same thing 
as Habermas himself, although obviously in the different terms of Anglo-
American jurisprudence and philosophy. If modern government is 
undermining our values and threatening our freedoms, we had better 
understand just how this process is occurring. Global condemnations of the 
administrative state as violating imagined principles of law serve little 
purpose; we need to understand the precise way in which that state creates 
the threatened dangers. There is a difference between the two books, 
however. Tamanaha’s realistic account of modern administrative law lacks 
the sense of condemnation that is implicit in Habermas’s account of modern 
law as a form of colonization. As he writes: “A holistic view highlights 
aspects of modern law ignored by analytical jurisprudents, among which 
[are] versatile government uses of law.”112 His account might therefore be 
subject to the criticism that he is validating a system of law that ought to be 
globally condemned. 
Although Habermas is writing in the phenomenological tradition, his 
assertion is subject to a response from within that tradition that would 
support Tamanaha’s more neutral and accepting stance toward the modern 
administrative state. Habermas has certainly identified a central and 
disconcerting aspect of the modernization process, but he has not 
necessarily provided an accurate account of its origin. He offers two 
alternatives. The first, which is the obvious one, is a Marxist, or more 
precisely neo-Marxist, analysis that views the colonization of the lifeworld 
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as a means by which capitalist elites retain the bulk of industrial 
production’s surplus value after democracy has triumphed, and the welfare 
state has been established.113 If their lifeworld has been colonized, then 
ordinary people will be unable to perceive this process and use democratic 
processes to change it. The second account, to which Habermas gives more 
attention, is Weber’s idea that society has been trapped into the colonization 
process by the conceptual forces that it generated in its rejection of the 
traditional society that preceded it.114  The instrumental rationality that 
began as a means of liberating society from the irrational and dysfunctional 
features of the Medieval era has become, in Weber’s famous phrase, an iron 
cage.115   
A different account, obviously metaphorical but readily translated into 
an interpretation of specific political and social events, is that the process 
Habermas describes is a trade-off that modern people have willingly 
embraced. To begin with knowledge, the unified or integrated society whose 
decline Weber and Habermas regret was one where analytic tools were 
relatively simple, although the level of knowledge might have been 
somewhat advanced. Every educated person knew Christian doctrine and 
the New Testament thoroughly (Habermas’s constative or theoretical mode 
of action). Explanations of physical reality (the teleological mode of action) 
were based on this doctrine and employed only rudimentary mathematics. 
Moral theory was derived from the same doctrine by means of arguments 
that were well understood, and aesthetics (dramaturgical action) were either 
based immediately on Christian values, such as Bellini’s paintings, or 
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derived from its moral theory, such as Shakespeare’s plays. While ordinary 
people might have grasped the various forms of knowledge only vaguely or 
partially, they could generally perceive their basic claims because Christian 
doctrine pervaded the entire society. But the Scientific Revolution offered 
possibilities for knowledge that lay beyond the grasp of even the average 
educated person. After about a century, people began to recognize and then 
implement its technological implications. The result was a vastly increased 
control of the natural world and the development of industrial products that 
proved enormously appealing to the average person. At present, almost 
everyone in Western society carries a cell phone with capacities that 
Renaissance people would not have dared attribute to a wizard. And it might 
just as well be magic for most people, who use the device five or ten hours 
a day and do not have the slightest idea how it works. 
Technology makes such developments possible, but these developments 
could not have been instantiated without a process of social organization 
that can be generally described as cumulative specialization. While many 
people in the Middle Ages were agriculturalists with limited and generalized 
skills, artisans often displayed highly specialized skills that took a lifetime 
and great talent to acquire. The stone carvers who decorated Chartres 
Cathedral easily matched, and probably exceeded, the capabilities of any 
modern industrial worker.116 But their skills, although they could not be 
duplicated by most people in the society, were readily understood. The stone 
carvers may have known of a few specialized techniques, but these could 
have been readily explained to an average person. In modern industrial 
processes, the people who design the products and organize their production 
are not only highly specialized, but use knowledge that has been built up 
and passed down over decades or centuries. Cell phones rely on a long series 
of discoveries about electricity, electronics, semiconductor materials, 
electromagnetic signals, astronomy, and relativistic effects. An enormous 
amount of learning, and not just practice, is necessary to understand the 
device, and this places the cell phone’s operation well beyond the 
understanding of the ordinary citizen. And that small number of people who 
have developed cell phones and fully understand the device will not be able 
to understand very different and equally complex products such as 
automobiles, airplanes or nuclear power plants.  
Non-technological knowledge has followed the same pattern, perhaps 
because of the impact of technology, perhaps because it reflects the same 
underlying social attitudes. We have excavated hundreds of Ancient Mayan 
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cities, deciphered their complex writing system, reconstructed the political 
conflicts of their city states and discerned the principles of their religion and 
the contours of their social structure. This level of knowledge can only be 
achieved by a cumulative research process funded by society through 
universities or institutes. Educated people can benefit from it by reading a 
book written for a general audience, or visiting on the excavated and 
reconstructed cities, but no one can contribute to the field without the many 
years of study needed to reach its advancing edge. Similarly, decades of 
empirical research, carried out by people with extensive academic training, 
have documented the conditions under which children suffer serious 
psychological damage from abuse by parents, step-parents or other 
caretakers. The validity of this research may be more open to challenge than 
electrical engineering or archaeology, but it cannot be dismissed in its 
entirety without attacking the general approach to knowledge that defines 
those other fields as well.  
 In order to exercise political control of a society such as ours, it is 
necessary for government to employ an equivalent level of specialization. 
How could public officials possibly decide whether a nuclear power plant 
is properly designed and safely operated without an agency staffed by 
officials who have a level of knowledge essentially equivalent to the 
engineers who designed and operate the facility? How can we deploy the 
knowledge we have gained about the effects of child abuse unless we rely 
on people who are familiar with the techniques and results of that 
knowledge? In other words, what Habermas describes as the colonization 
of the lifeworld by political forces can be attributed to the basic structure of 
knowledge in modern society. The actions of the Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission are incomprehensible to ordinary people because the facilities 
it regulates are incomprehensible, and they are incomprehensible because 
they are the product of the cumulative specialization that characterizes 
modern society. The incomprehensibility of our political and economic 
systems for the average person is a necessary consequence of the distinctive 
benefits that these systems confer. 
This incomprehensibility creates dangers for us, of course, but before 
assuming it produces deleterious effects on our lifeworld generally, it is 
necessary to interrogate our own beliefs, as Husserl recommends. Is what 
Habermas describes as the colonization of the lifeworld the misfortune or 
disaster he and Weber claim, or are they judging it in terms of traditional 
attitudes that no longer prevail in modern society? Perhaps the 
specialization of government agencies that makes their actions opaque to 
ordinary people, and the bureaucratization that both enables and reflects that 
specialization, is a product of our lifeworld, rather than an intrusion on it. It 












may be true that the modes of action in our lifeworld—teleological, 
constative, normative and dramaturgical—have become separated from 
each other, and that this reflect the breakdown of the previous conceptual 
unity of society, but that may reflect our modern sensibility, rather than 
intrusion on our sensibility by outside forces. Modern people tend to divide 
their experience into different spheres and seek fulfillment in each one.117 
They speak readily and familiarly about doing well in their career but having 
trouble in their person life; they think of going to church and to a theater or 
museum as satisfying distinctly different inclinations or desires; they 
describe other people as being nice, admirable individuals but not effective 
at their jobs. In short, the idea of making global assessments of one’s life 
and of other people may have been the result of a religious mentality that 
saw the purpose of life as going to heaven rather than hell, as judging others 
as either good or evil. That is simply not the way we think today. 
Thus, the bureaucratization of government that Tamanaha is willing to 
accept as a feature of our legal system is not necessarily in conflict with the 
lifeworld of individuals in our society. Its particular actions may be 
incomprehensible to ordinary people, but they may accept that as a trade-
off for the advantages of modern society, and recognize it as the same 
feature that characterizes all knowledge-based enterprises. At the same 
time, people may fully understand the structure of specialization that leads 
to this incomprehensibility. They may accept the compartmentalized 
character of government because their own lifeworld is compartmentalized, 
because the separation between different action orientations is not a 
metaphysical disaster for them but the way they think and live. In other 
words, the negative interpretation of the process Habermas describes as 
colonization may be the very tendency that his methodology warns us to 
avoid, namely, the unexamined transfer of one society’s mode of thought to 
a different society.118    
None of this suggests that we should be complacent about our legal 
system. Because modern government exercises vast and potentially 
oppressive power, we need to be vigilant in monitoring its actions and to 
make use of democratic process, social protest and academic criticism to 
contain it. But global condemnations based on outmoded norms, of the sort 
that Hayek and even Habermas advance, are not likely to contribute to this 
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process. Tamanaha’s realistic theory of law provides a more effective 
starting point. Using a conventionalist account, that is, an account that can 
be regarded as derived from and comprehensible to the lifeworld of the 
individuals in our society, he includes all the operations of the modern 
administrative state in his theory and law and leaves open the possibility 
that we will approve or condemn its particular features on the basis of 
thoughtful analysis, rather than a priori definitions. 
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